Tentative Rulings for August 14, 2025
Department 502

For any matter where an oral argument is requested and any party to the hearing desires a remote appearance, such request must be timely submitted to and approved by the hearing judge. In this department, the remote appearance will be conducted through Zoom. If approved, please provide the department's clerk a correct email address. (CRC 3.672, Fresno Sup.C. Local Rule 1.1.19)

There are no tentative rulings for the following cases. The hearing will go forward on these matters. If a person is under a court order to appear, he/she must do so. Otherwise, parties should appear unless they have notified the court that they will submit the matter without an appearance. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1304(c).) ***The above rule also applies to cases listed in this "must appear" section.***

The court has continued the following cases. The deadlines for opposition and reply papers will remain the same as for the original hearing date.

(Tentative Rulings begin at the next page)

Tentative Rulings for Department 502

Begin at the next page

(03)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Acevedo v. Starbucks Corp.***
Case No. 25CECG01145

Hearing Date: August 14, 2025 (Dept. 502)

Motion: Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim

Tentative Ruling:

To deny defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages and the allegations supporting the prayer.

Explanation:

Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

In addition, "An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation." (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

"As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) 'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) 'Oppression' means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) 'Fraud' means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c), paragraph breaks omitted.)

Where the plaintiff's complaint does not allege facts showing that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, a prayer for punitive damages is improper and should be stricken. (*Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc.* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63-64.) "The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading

to support such a claim." (*Grieves v. Superior Court* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, citations omitted.) Conclusory allegations that defendant acted with "malice, fraud, and oppression" are insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages without further supporting facts. (*Smith v. Superior Court* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

"'Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or "malice," or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, *or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.*"' (*Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co.* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 328, citations omitted, italics in original.)

Plaintiff has alleged that defendant negligently injured him by giving him tea that was excessively hot, with a lid that was not properly secured, and not contained in a double cup, which caused the tea to spill in his lap and severely burn him. (Complaint, p. 4, ¶ GN-1.) "Defendant served hot tea to Plaintiff at an unsafe temperature, which was excessively hot in violation of industry standards for the temperature of hot tea, which Defendants, and each of them, knew created an unreasonable risk of harm to its customers as known by Defendants, and each of them, as a result of previous incidents at their coffee shops. Defendants, and each of them, breached their duty of care by serving hot tea at an unsafe temperature and failed to provide adequate warnings to Plaintiff when they served hot tea at an unsafe temperature." (*Ibid*.)

In addition, in support of his punitive damages prayer, plaintiff alleges that, "prior to February 21, 2025, the officers directors, employees, and/or managing agents of Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, were aware of the high danger and the severity of risk of injury to customers as a result of serving hot tea at an unsafe temperature, which was excessively hot. Prior to that time, the officers, directors, employees, and/or managing agents of Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, were put on notice of this high risk to customers as a result of complaints, claims and/or lawsuits by other customers who were injured or were damaged by the hot tea served at an unsafe temperature, which was excessively hot." (*Id*. at p. 5, EX-2.)

Also, "prior to February 21, 2025, the officers, directors, employees, and/or managing agents of Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, were aware that hot tea was being served at an unsafe temperature, which was excessively hot, and they knew this created an unreasonable risk of harm to its customers, and further, failed to adequately provide notice of warning of this condition to its customers and serve hot tea using safe handling procedures." (*Ibid*.)

"The hot teas, including the subject hot tea, was served at an unsafe temperature, which was excessively hot, despite the fact that Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, knew the importance of customers being able to safely handle and drink their hot tea without a severe risk of injury, despite the fact that it would have been practical and relatively inexpensive for Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, to serve their hot teas, including the subject hot tea safely and at a safe temperature that is not excessively hot." (*Ibid*.)

"Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, know and expect the hot tea they serve will be attempted to be drunk by their customers,

handled by their customers and handed by their employees to customers through the drive-thru window using safe handling procedures.

Despite this knowledge, Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, by and through their officers, directors, and/or managing agents, failed to correct this condition by safely serving hot tea at a safe temperature using safe handling procedures or even advise or warn customers by providing warnings of the severe risk of injury from any attempt to handle or drink hot teas, including the subject hot tea, acting in conscious disregard for the rights and safety of customers, including Plaintiff." (*Ibid*.)

"At all times herein mentioned, the officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, authorized and/or ratified the conduct of their employees, who knew of should have known of the growing number of serious injuries and damages to customers who purchased and/or attempted to handle and drink hot tea, from hot tea being served at an unsafe temperature, and the need for hot tea to be served at a safe temperature and/or provide additional warnings and safe handling procedures. Further, at all times mentioned herein, the officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendants, STARBUCKS CORPORATION, DOES 1-25, and each of them, authorized and/or ratified the conduct of their employees, who knowingly failed to safely serve hot tea, including the subject hot tea, at safe a temperature in spite of their knowledge of the danger, and the availability of technically and economically reasonable safety precautions to prevent serious bodily injury to customers by safely serving hot tea at a safe temperature and/or provide additional warnings and safe handling procedures." (*Ibid*.)

Thus, plaintiff has alleged that defendant not only negligently injured him by serving tea that was excessively hot, but also that defendant's officers, directors, and managing agents were on notice of the danger posed by the excessively hot tea due to prior incidents where customers were burned by hot beverages at their stores. Plaintiff also alleges that Starbucks has been sued by customers who were burned by hot beverages prior to the subject incident, so it was aware of the danger posed by the excessively hot tea. (Complaint, p. 5, EX-2.)[1] Nevertheless, defendant allegedly did not warn of the danger or do anything to prevent or mitigate the danger posed by the excessively hot tea. As a result, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that defendant acted with conscious disregard for the rights and safety of its customers. Plaintiff has also alleged that the defendant's officers, directors or managing agents ratified the conduct of the employees.

While defendant contends that plaintiff's allegations are nothing more than conclusions that are unsupported by any real facts, plaintiff is not required to plead evidentiary facts in order to support his claim. He only needs to plead the ultimate facts

[1] Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of the complaint and verdict form in one such case, *Michael Garcia v. Starbucks Corporation*, Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. 20OSTCV10214. (See Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice.) The court will take judicial notice of the court documents under Evidence Code section 452(d). The fact that Starbucks has been sued by at least one other customer after allegedly suffering burns from a hot beverage supports plaintiff's allegation that defendant was on notice of the danger posed by its hot beverages and still failed to do anything to mitigate or warn of the danger.

to support his prayer for punitive damages, which he has done here. Furthermore, most of the facts regarding defendant's officers, directors, or managing agents' knowledge of the danger posed by the hot tea and their alleged ratification of their employees' conduct are presumably in the possession of defendant. The court will not require plaintiff to allege detailed facts to support his claim when most of the facts are likely in the defendant's possession. Any such facts can be obtained in discovery.

Consequently, the court intends to deny the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and the allegations that support the prayer.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: KCK on 08/08/25.
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(41)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***Irma Austin vs Captain Fantastic, Inc.***
Superior Court Case No. 25CECG00403

Hearing Date: August 14, 2025 (Dept. 502)

Motions: Demurrer and Motion to Strike by Defendant Cameron Aguilar

Tentative Ruling:

To overrule the demurrer with defendant granted leave to answer within 10 days; to deny the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and the allegations supporting the prayer. The time to answer shall run from the date of service by the clerk of the minute order.

Explanation:

Plaintiffs Irma Austin, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Edward Austin, Elissa Austin, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Irma Austin, and Julie Marie Bryan, initiated this action by filing a complaint (Complaint) against codefendants Cameron Aguilar and Captain Fantastic, Inc. dba Strummers. Plaintiffs allege Ms. Aguilar's reckless driving and "drifting" maneuvers in a parking lot while intoxicated caused the death of decedent Edward Austin and caused Ms. Bryan to sustain serious injuries. Ms. Aguilar demurs to the first cause of action for "Gross Negligence – Motor Vehicle," alleged by the "Estate of Edward Austin" and Ms. Bryan against her.

Meet and Confer

Ms. Aguilar's counsel filed and served a declaration stating counsel met and conferred by telephone with plaintiffs' counsel on June 6, 2025. The parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the matters raised by the demurrer and defendant's counsel filed a declaration for an automatic extension. This satisfies the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 for the demurring party to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the opposing party. (See also, Code Civ. Proc., §435.5 [same for motion to strike].)

Demurrer

Ms. Aguilar demurs generally to the first cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and specially for uncertainty under subdivision (f). "The sole issue involved in a hearing on a demurrer is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected

with extraneous material, states a cause of action." (*Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc.* (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 7, 18.) In testing a pleading against a demurrer, the alleged facts are deemed true, "however improbable they may be." (*Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials* Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading--not the truth of the plaintiff's allegations or the accuracy of the plaintiff's description of the defendant's conduct. (*Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co*. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.) The court "may affirm the sustaining of a demurrer only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory." (*Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.) "If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer." (*Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., supra,* 19 Cal.4th at p. 38.)

Here, the title of the first cause of action is "Gross Negligence – Motor Vehicle." California does not recognize a cause of action for "gross negligence" unless such an action is directly, or at least implicitly, authorized by one of the numerous statutes that employ gross negligence as the applicable standard. (*Continental Ins. Co. v. American Protection Industries* (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322, 330; *Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc*. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 758, 766, fn. 9 ["In reality, California does not recognize a distinct cause of action for 'gross negligence' independent of a statutory basis."]) For example, the concept of gross negligence arises frequently in the context of a release for sporting or recreational activities, where a release may exculpate a tortfeasor from future simple negligence, but not gross negligence. (See *City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 759, fn. 12 [numerous cases have upheld validity of agreements waiving ordinary negligence claims in use of fitness facilities].) Under Penal Code section 191.5, the factfinder must distinguish between "gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated," and "vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated."

If gross negligence is relevant to an issue in the complaint, it "is pleaded by alleging the traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages." (*Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.) Ms. Aguilar does not dispute that the Complaint "involves allegations of ordinary negligence[.]" (Dem., p. 4:20-21.) Therefore, the court overrules Ms. Aguilar's general demurrer to the first cause of action, which includes the necessary elements of "ordinary negligence." (Allegations of oppression, fraud, or malice are relevant to establish a claim for punitive damages, as discussed below.)

Ms. Aguilar also demurs under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), which authorizes a party against whom a complaint has been filed to object by special demurrer to the pleading on the ground that "[t]he pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, 'uncertain' includes ambiguous and unintelligible." (*Ibid*.) "A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (*Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc*. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) "[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond." (*Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, quoting *Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) Here, the Complaint is not so vague, confusing, or ambiguous that it is impossible for Ms. Aguilar to respond. Ms. Aguilar should be able to

determine what issues must be admitted or denied. Accordingly, the first cause of action is not uncertain and the demurrer on this basis is overruled.

Motion to Strike

Ms. Aguilar moves to strike certain allegations of the Complaint and the prayer for punitive damages. In her notice of motion to strike, Ms. Aguilar incorrectly cites Code of Civil Procedure section 476 as the basis for the motion. However, in her memorandum she correctly cites Code of Civil Procedure section 436, which provides:

> The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.

A motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 is appropriate to remove a claim for punitive damages that lacks support based on the facts alleged in the complaint. (*Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2003) 110 CalApp.4th 1145.)

The parties agree that the wrongful death statute does not provide for an award of punitive damages. But punitive damages are recoverable in some negligence cases. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) provides for punitive damages in tort cases upon a showing of oppression, fraud, or malice:

> In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
>
> The statute contains its own definitions of the relevant terms:
>
> (1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
> (2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
> (3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c).)

Ms. Aguilar relies on *Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149 (*Flyer's*), which held "a breach of a fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages." (*Id.* at p.

1154.) She also attempts to distinguish three cases of intoxicated driving where the court found the plaintiff had presented sufficient outrageous facts to support an allegation of punitive damages.

In *Taylor v. Superior Court* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the California Supreme Court held that punitive damages in that case were recoverable from an intoxicated driver who caused personal injury. (See also, *Peterson v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 150, holding the *Taylor* rule applied retroactively where plaintiffs' allegations that defendant drove with excessive speed after consuming alcohol and lost control causing personal injury to plaintiff stated facts sufficient to support award of punitive damages; *Dawes v. Superior Court* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 [plaintiff pleaded facts from which defendant's conscious disregard of other's safety and probability of injury to others could be reasonably inferred to justify award of punitive damages where plaintiff alleged driver, while intoxicated, ran a stop sign, zigzagged in and out of traffic at speeds in excess of 65 mph in a 35 mph zone, with reckless disregard of the probable consequences].)

Plaintiffs are not required to plead evidentiary facts in order to support their claim. They must plead only the ultimate facts to support the prayer for punitive damages, which they have done. Plaintiffs have alleged facts from which the factfinder may reasonably infer Ms. Aguilar acted with malice. Plaintiffs allege Ms. Aguilar had a history of similar dangerous conduct in the same location, a pattern of deliberately harassing unhoused individuals in the area, she made a decision to drive while heavily intoxicated, she chose to perform dangerous "drifting" maneuvers in an area known to be frequented by pedestrians, she fled the scene after the accident, and hid from responding law enforcement officers. (Comp., ¶¶ 12, 15, 18, 23, 24.) Based on plaintiffs' allegations, a jury could reasonably infer that Ms. Aguilar engaged in despicable conduct with a conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. Therefore, the court finds plaintiffs have pleaded facts to justify an award of punitive damages and denies the motion to strike.

Late Papers

Ms. Aguilar complains about plaintiffs' late papers, but she did not ask for a continuance nor show prejudice caused by the late filing. The court exercises its discretion to resolve the demurrer and motion to strike on the merits. (See *Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc.* (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1202 [filing opposition two days late with no showing of prejudice to other side supported court's discretion to consider late paper in "view of the strong policy of the law favoring the disposition of cases on the merits"].)

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: KCK on 08/12/25.
(Judge's initials) (Date)

(46)

Tentative Ruling

Re: ***John Gonzales v. Ashley Global Retail, LLC***
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03985

Hearing Date: August 14, 2025 (Dept. 502)

Motion: for Terminating Sanctions, or in the alternative Monetary Sanctions, and to Compel the Deposition of Defendant's Person Most Knowledgeable

Tentative Ruling:

To deny the motion for terminating sanctions. To deny the motion to compel.

To grant the alternatively requested monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff John Gonzales. Defendant Stoneledge Furniture, LLC is ordered to pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiff's counsel, Paboojian, Inc., in the total amount of $1,560.00, within 20 calendar days of the date of this order, with the time to run from the service of this minute order.

Explanation:

Terminating Sanctions

Plaintiff moves for terminating sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2023.030 subdivision (d), whereby the court may impose a terminating sanction by an order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. Plaintiff argues that disobeying a court order to provide discovery constitutes a misuse of the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010 subd. (g)) and Defendant's failure to comply with the court's order on the Request for Pretrial Discovery Conference warrants terminating sanctions.

The imposition of terminating sanctions is a drastic consequence, one that should not lightly be imposed, or requested. (*Ruvalcaba v. Government Employees Ins. Co*. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1581.) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where the failure was willful. (*Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp*. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.)

Plaintiff does not address the willfulness of defendant's failure to comply with the court's order. However, defendant in its opposition argues that its failure to comply was not willful. Mr. Jonathon J. Herzog, the defense attorney currently handling the case, claims that the attorney formerly handling this matter assured him she was making arrangements for the PMK to appear at deposition. (Herzog Decl., ¶ 4.) After the former handling attorney left his firm and he took up this case, he spoke with plaintiff's counsel and assured him dates and a witness would be provided. (*Id*., ¶ 5.) Dates were provided to plaintiff on August 1, 2025. (*Id*., ¶ 6.) Although plaintiff feels that these dates are tardy and a result of the filing of this motion, dates were provided and defendant has demonstrated a willingness to comply with the court's order, albeit belatedly. The

willfulness required for terminating sanctions is not present, and therefore the motion for terminating sanctions is denied.

Motion to Compel Attendance

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or a person designated by an organization that is a party, without having served a valid objection, fails to appear for examination or to proceed with it, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450 subd. (a).

The motion to compel a deponent's attendance must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.

Plaintiff took a non-appearance at the scheduled deposition of Defendant's PMK on April 25, 2025. (Kane Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. A.) As the deponent failed to attend the deposition, plaintiff must make a declaration that the he has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. Plaintiff does not state in his declaration that he inquired from Defendant about the nonappearance of Defendant's PMK, and instead focuses on detailing other various steps he has taken since that time. As such, this threshold has not been met and the motion is denied.

Monetary Sanctions

As an alternative to terminating sanctions, plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,910.00 under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts over the past few months to schedule this deposition and to accommodate defendant, who has failed to cooperate, including its failure to timely respond to the court order to participate in the PMK deposition. Monetary sanctions are warranted, although the court will reduce the amount to $1,560.00.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling
Issued By: KCK on 08/13/25.
(Judge's initials) (Date)